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Early Experiences with Experimentation on 
Dynamic Organizational Structures * 
William G. Kemple, Susan G. Hutchins, David L. Kleinman, 
Kishore Sengupta, Michael C. Berigan, and Neil A. Smith 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Abstract 
The initial experiment in the Adaptive 
Architectures for Command and Control 
(A2C2) project was designed to integrate 
the project's efforts, and serve as a 
baseline for future research. This paper 
describes preliminary lessons-learned in 
the following areas: (1) experimental 
design, and the difficulties of running 
repeated conditions with 6+ person teams 
in a controlled setting; (2) challenges of 
scenario abstraction and design, work-
load, coordination requirements, and 
enforcement of task and organizational 
structure as an independent variable; (3) 
task and organizational structure, 
including levels of abstraction and task 
dynamics; ( 4) good and bad points of the 
DDD-111 for future work, in which 
organizational and/or task structure may 
change during the course of an exper-
iment; (5) experimental conduct, includ-
ing assignment of subjects, training and 
planning, and the common opeational 
picture; and (6) data collection instru-
ments and implementation-from those 
automated in the DDD-111, to the use of 
real-time observers and subject question-
naires. 
*This research is funded by a grant from the Office of Naval 
Research, Cognitive and Neural Sciences Division. 
1 Introduction 
The Adaptive Architectures for Command and 
Control (A2C2) project is an ONR-sponsored 
research initiative to: ( 1) extend 12 years of naval 
C2 decisionmaking research into the Joint arena; 
(2) focus on adaptive architectures within Joint 
decisionmaking organizations; and (3) produce 
results ranging from purely theoretical to those 
that can be used by operational forces in the near 
term. The empirical approach taken by the A2C2 
project is to use a series of increasingly realistic 
experiments, with the initial tier I involving 
experiments in a controlled laboratory environ-
ment. The first tier I experiment, described in a 
companion paper [Kemple, Kleinman and 
Berigan, 1996], was designed as an integration 
vehicle, synthesizing many aspects of the 
project's three-pronged effort, and as a baseline 
for future tier I, II, and III experiments. 
· The first experiment was constrained and 
guided by a number of issues such as: the 
available subject pool at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS); the requirement that any scenario 
developed be Joint in its nature; , facilities 
available to conduct a distributed decisiomaking 
experiment at NPS; factors of interest to the A2C2 
project; the desire for the experiment to be 
conducive to modeling and simulation; and the 
limitations and capabilities of the newly enhanced 
Distributed Dynamic Decisionmaking (DDD) 
simulator [Kleinman, Young and Higgins, 1996]. 
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Resolving these issues involved making 
compromises between laboratory control and 
operational realism, some of which are described 
in this paper. 
Analysis of the experimental results, to 
examine interactions between the two independent 
variables (Task and Organizational Structure), is 
currently on-going. This paper will discuss some 
of our salient experiences in the planning and 
execution of the first experiment. Some of these 
topics include: 
• Experimental design, and the difficulties of 
running repeated conditions with 6+ person 
teams in a controlled setting. 
• Challenges of scenario abstraction and design; 
control of the team workload, uncertainty, and 
coordination requirements both globally and 
locally; and methods to enforce a specific task 
or organizational structure as an independent 
variable (how to prevent subjects from 
performing tasks in arbitrary ways) 
• Task and organizational structure, including 
levels of abstraction and aggregation, and 
future consideration of dynamic tasks. 
• Good and bad points of the enhanced DDD-III 
for future work, where organizational and/or 
task structure may change during the course of 
an experiment. 
• Issues of conduct of the experiment itself, 
including assignment of subjects to positions 
in the organizational structure, training and 
planning, and the common opeational picture. 
• Data collection instruments and implemen-
tation-from those automated in the DDD-III 
( on-line aggregation of mini-measures), to the 
use of real-time observers, and freezing the 
scenario to administer subject questionnaires. 
2 Experimental Design 
The experiment was a 2x2 factorial design, with 
two levels of organizational structure and two 
levels of task structure. All other factors were 
held constant. With 24 officers available as 
decisionmaker (DM) subjects, a design was 
developed that called for four, six-person teams. 
Each team underwent four training runs, and then 
experienced all four experimental conditions in 
counterbalanced order. The following sub-
sections summarize some of the experiences 
regarding the design. 
2.1 Organizational Structure 
The experiment involved a Joint Task Force 
(JTF), composed of the Commander (CJTF), a 
maritime component, and a ground component. 
The organizational structure was either a two- or 
three-layer hierarchy. Both structures were played 
in the maritime component and in the ground 
component. When the maritime component was 
in a two-layer hierarchy, two low-level 
commanders ( an Amphibious Ready Group 
(ARG) and a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)) 
reported directly to the CJTF. In the three-layer 
hierarchy, these two low-level commanders 
reported to a Maritime Component Commander 
(MCC), who reported to the CJTF. Similarly, 
when the ground component was in a two-layer 
hierarchy, two Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
commanders reported directly to the CJTF, while 
in the three-layer hierarchy, the two MEU 
commanders reported to a Ground Component 
Commander (GCC), who reported to the CJTF. 
The entire JTF was never played in a totally 
two-layered structure or in a totally three-layered 
structure. To keep team size constant, one 
component always had a middle level of hierarchy 
and the other did not. Thus, when the maritime 
component was at two layers, the ground 
component was at three, and vice versa. As a 
result, the CJTF never changed his overall span of 
control, and did not experience the change in 
workload that would normally accompany 
removing a layer from the command hierarchy. 
We could have allowed different team sizes to 
mimic reality, e.g., a 5-person team (with no 
middle layer) and a 7-person team (with middle 
layers). This was vetoed so as to avoid taskload-
per-individual problems that would have arisen in 
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subsequent data analysis. Our hybrid approach, 
wherein components are considered separately, 
required a more complex scenario design in task 
structure (as it was our intent to average 2- and 3-
level results across components in order to double 
the number of data points). So far, the hybrid 
approach seems to have been a reasonable 
compromise--although some cross-training issues 
arose, which are discussed later. 
2.2. Number of Units (nodes) and Workload 
The four subordinate units seemed to keep the 
CJTF busy enough during the training runs for 
intermediate commanders to be helpful. 
However, during the data runs the CJTF did not 
seem as busy, and the value of his intermediate-
level commanders was dubious. The CJTF's span 
of control was never very large in the 
experiment-never exceeding three direct reports. 
Future experiments will need to consider a 
larger number of nodes when examining the 
myriad of issues in organizational structures. 
However, constraints of hardware availability, 
subjects, and data analysis will likely limit the 
number of human DMs we can consider to 
between 6-8. The other nodes will have to be 
represented by computer models (or surrogates). 
The challenges here are to: (1) determine those 
nodes in the organization that will be filled by 
human DMs, (2) develop models for the other 
nodes, and (3) interface these models to the 
software used to run the distributed simulation. 
In the experiment the CVBG also was not very 
busy. His operational time scale was slower than 
that of the ground commanders in terms of 
tasks/unit time. Also, he did not own aircraft per 
se. His activities were largely focused on 
launching aircraft in response to requests from 
other DMs. In future experimentation, these types 
of activities (especially of the lowest-level units) 
are candidates for representation by models. 
2.3 Teams versus Organizations 
The experiment employed six-person teams as a 
representation of a three-level organization with 
six nodes. Therefore, each person in a team 
represented a node, which, in a real organization, 
can consist of several individuals. Constraints on 
the size of subject pools make such surrogating 
unavoidable in experimental settings. However, 
future experiments can examine ways in which 
the nodes are enhanced in terms of their 
computational richness. One possibility would be 
to introduce automated agents, several of which 
are attached to each node. An individual 
representing a node can then rely on the services 
of "staff members" to perform components of a 
larger task. The design of such agents can be 
guided by previous research in the areas of 
distributed artificial intelligence and 
computational organizational theory. 
3 Task and Organizational Structures 
The task structures employed in the experiment 
were formulated as a series of precedence 
relationships among individual tasks. The 
"primitives" used in the design of these structures 
captured relationships such as sequence, 
simultaneity, and/or precedences, etc. Two 
components were missing in the design, and are 
discussed below. 
3.1 Levels of Task Abstraction/Aggregation 
Abstraction simply means that a (large) task can 
be progressively decomposed into smaller pieces 
until it reaches the point of non-decomposability 
[Simon, 1981]. For example, an across-the-beach 
assault can be decomposed into smaller (sub)tasks 
of clearing mines, landing on the beach, and so 
on. However, abstraction also implies that when 
viewed at different levels, the performance of a 
task may entail different sets of cognitive skills. 
Indeed, this is often a reason for creating 
hierarchies. At the highest level of the 
organization, the assault involves activities such 
as planning, task assignment, resource allocation, 
etc. Once the assault is underway, the task from 
the perspective of the high level is essentially one 
of monitoring, and if necessary, directing changes 
in a pre-defined plan. 
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Now consider the same task, but viewed from 
the perspective of the lower level( s) of the 
organization. The task now appears to be one of 
implementing specific subtasks, keeping the 
superiors informed, and requesting further orders 
or interpretation if necessary. Thus, the same 
broad task may appear to be very different to 
different levels of an organizational hierarchy. 
This, in turn, requires different parts of the 
hierarchy to perform tasks that are different not 
only in substance, but also in their underlying 
cognitive content. The structures used in this 
experiment were not sufficiently sensitive to the 
issue of levels of abstraction, a deficiency that 
should inform the development of task structures 
in future experiments. 
3.2 Task Dynamics 
A second element of task structure, not 
sufficiently addressed in this experiment, relates 
to the extent to which individual tasks in a 
structure are dynamic. Dynamic tasks can change 
their properties and characteristics as a function of 
time. Thus, depending on when the task is 
actually executed, the complexity, resource, 
information and coordination elements may be 
significantly different. Consider the example of a 
forest fire that needs to be put out [Brehmer, 
1990]. If handled at reasonably early stages, the 
frre can usually be extinguished with relative ease, 
without requiring large investments of resources. 
However, if left unattended, the same fire can 
grow in magnitude, thereby altering significantly 
the resources required to fight it, the coordination 
among the fire-fighting units, and the chances of 
extinguishing it. 
4 Scenario Design 
The scenario used in the experiment was adapted 
from the scenario employed for the field research 
portion of the A2C2 project. This scenario was 
designed to induce competition over specific 
assets in a manner that was consistent across 
trials, so that the subjects' resolution of the 
competition could be measured. 
4.1 Realism versus Competition Events 
Balancing realism with the forcing of competition 
over assets was the most difficult scenario design 
issue. To induce the specific competition events 
of interest to us in task processing, we virtually 
had to force a unique asset-to-task association. 
This is inherently unrealistic ( as was pointed out 
by some of our more operationally astute 
subjects), since JTFs commonly have several, or 
even many, different assets that could perform a 
given task. On the other hand, had we designed 
the scenarios to more accurately reflect the real 
world, then the teams could have developed their 
own task structures, and avoided entirely the 
competition events that were the focus of the 
experiment. In retrospect, it would have been 
useful to make the competition involve a 
combination of assets, rather than a single asset, 
but the tradeoff is that scenario development 
would have become far more challenging, and that 
operational background and "weaponeering" skill 
on the part of the subjects would have a 
confounding effect on the dependent variables. 
Scenario design tools, simulations and/or analytic 
models would prove helpful to such an endeavor. 
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4.2 Competition Events 
Each scenario contained 3 or 4 competition 
events. It would have been useful to increase the 
number of competition events to 5 or 6, and thus 
increase the number of data points. One way to 
effect this increase would have been to have many 
more tasks appear that would be likely to require 
asset coordination among DMs, and observe the 
competition for limited assets as it occurred. This 
would avoid the need to craft the scenarios to the 
extent done. We would observe the competitions 
as dependent variables, rather than trying to 
embed the competitions into the scenario as 
independent variables. 
4.3 Attrition of Assets 
The subjects complained that the scenario did not 
attrite friendly forces. The experiment was 
actually so designed; if important assets were 
"lost" early in the scenario, then they would not be 
around to be competed for later. Attrition was 
represented in the experiment by a "strength" 
score, which was an aggregated score based on the 
degree to which the subjects protected their assets 
( and defended zones) from enemy attack, avoided 
obstacles such as minefields and swamps, and 
attacked the enemy with the proper assets. We 
felt this was as good a compromise between 
realism and the requirements of the experiment as 
we were likely to get. 
In general, we do not wish the assets available 
to the team to be a (uncontrollable) function of the 
team's sample path through the scenario. This is 
critical to controlled experimentation since the 
task/mission structure is generally predicated on 
assets available. Future research may consider 
some different ways of modeling attrition in our 
tier-I experiments. 
4.4 Adapting DDD to the Broader Operational Domain 
The DDD-III was very amenable to scenario 
development in a JTF domain. The vast majority 
of artificialities that were built into the scenario 
had to do with driving teams into competitive 
situations, rather than with DDD limitations. The 
only significant difficulty involved the use of 
computerized communication messages. When 
the DDD-II was used in a maritime AA W context, 
relatively few, pre-formatted messages sufficed, 
and computerized communications was feasible. 
However, in a JTF context, the number of possible 
messages is much larger. It would be too time 
consuming for the players to scroll through all the 
possibilities whenever they needed to 
communicate with another player. In a JTF 
situation, a better solution would be to allow 
semi-free text messages ( or free-form e-mail) or, 
if not feasible, allow verbal communication. 
5 Developing and Implementing the DDD-111 
The DDD-II simulator was extended and adapted 
to meet the general needs of A2C2 tier-I, 
controlled, laboratory-based empirical research, as 
well as the specific needs of the first (Joint) 
experiment. These were considerable efforts, with 
conceptual design, software development and 
testing done concurrently at NPS and at the 
University of Connecticut. The following is a 
summary of some salient experiences in the 
"birth" of the DDD-III. 
5.1 Overall Utilization and Power of the DDD-111 
The underlying DDD paradigm, which includes 
the concepts of tasks with attribute information 
that must be learned by the team, coupled with 
assets that contain sensors and resources to 
observe and process tasks, was found quite 
powerful for tier-I research. The paradigm was 
able to represent most of the JTF features needed 
by the designers of the first experiment. 
Moreover, the high degree of specificity needed to 
describe the distribution of assets, rules of game 
conduct, task arrival dynamics and associated 
attribute values, etc., brings the DDD scenarios to 
a level commensurate with analytic modeling 
and/or computer simulations. In fact, previous 
research efforts (using the DDD-II) have built 
concomitant normative-descriptive models that 
were driven by the same input data files as the 
DDD. 
5.1.1 Manipulation of Task and Structural Variables 
The DDD-III allows the experimenter to easily 
manipulate and control many dimensions of task 
structure ( e.g., tempo, loading, precedence 
requirements), and most of the salient dimensions 
of organizational structure (e.g., authority, inform-
ation, communication, resource, assignment). 
This was of major importance in the design of the 
first experiment, where attribute and resource 
values ( and task parameters) were under continual 
adjustment in order to achieve the desired 
competition-for-assets events. 
5.1.2 Automated Data Collection and Retrieval 
A major aspect of the DDD-III is its on-line 
automated data recording capability. Numerous 
dependent variables, specified by the experi-
menter, can be collected, averaged, and output for 
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immediate post-experiment analysis. A logfile 
contains a time-tagged running history of the 
actions taken by each DM. The software also has 
the ability to replay a run from the logfile. This 
feature, besides being useful for team training, 
was expeditious for our reconstructing a missing 
dependent variable file. (It can also be used to 
easily compute new dependent variables in an 
automated way by replaying the scenario/s 
through "new" data aggregation code.) Finally, 
the ability to pause the game, restart, and run at 
faster (or slower) speed was invaluable in 
administering subject self-report measures and 
allowing experimenter control over the game 
clock. 
5.1.3 Local Access to DDD Source Code 
Access to the DDD-III source code meant that 
changes could be made quickly to both game 
implementation/operationalization and to depen-
dent variable collection. This is a necessity for a 
tier-I simulator, where its use to test new concepts 
for exploratory research is paramount, and where 
experiment control is essential to establish 
significance of research findings ( albeit at the 
expense of comproIIllsmg some reality). 
Moreover, the running of subsequent experiments 
with larger sized organizations is likely to require 
the embedding of "models" for several 
organization nodes in the DDD, a feature that may 
prove elusive if source code is not accessible. 
Subsequent tier-II simulators are not likely to 
afford immediate access to source code, so that 
control and measure implementation will be more 
challenging issues in our future work. 
5.2 Constraints to Communications 
It was our decision to run the first experiment 
without voice communication among DMs in 
order to facilitate subsequent analysis of message 
traffic. Thus, team members were provided with, 
and used, formatted computer generated messages 
to: request assets, request/send information on a 
task, advise others of intent to ( or send a request 
to) support, handle, or ignore action on specific 
tasks, etc. The messages were recorded and time-
tagged for future analysis. The set of messages 
was developed with lead team assistance to try to 
be as encompassing as possible given the 
coordination requirements of the scenario. 
Although the DDD-II had been used before at 
NPS in a non-voice mode, many subjects in the 
post-experiment debrief and questionnaire 
complained about the use of formatted messages 
versus open voice communications. This was a 
far more complex experiment using the DDD 
paradigm than had previously been attempted, 
with attendant heavier demand upon the 
coordination requirements of subjects. 
Consequently, subjects felt that the formatted 
messages inhibited their ability to fully 
communicate intent, and to send messages of a 
"general" nature that were beyond the pre-
formatted DDD message structure. 
Future experiments should either enlarge the 
types and numbers of formatted messages 
augmented by a "free text" input capability, or 
allow voice communication. Allowing (time-
tagged) voice to be the primary explicit 
coordination media, while adding considerable 
effort to analyze message flow and content from 
voice tapes, does provide richer data to peer into 
the team decision processes. The decision as to 
which path our future tier-I research will follow is 
being discussed; however it is recognized that 
tier-II experimentation will certainly involve 
voice circuits. 
5.3 DDD Software Development 
Managing the distributed software development 
effort was a challenge, due to dynamic version 
control, style of different programmers, different 
hardware/software configurations, etc., but not 
without its rewards. Having part of the 
development team working directly with the NPS 
"users"-in this case the people designing/ 
implementing the first experiment and the 
scenario-was invaluable. This allowed us to: 
prioritize the extensive DDD-II to DDD-III 
conversion effort ( over 100 changes to some 
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60,000 lines of C code); decide which new design 
features were needed and why; utilize the lead 
team in debugging and testing the software on a 
rich scenario; while all along the way obtaining 
input and critique from researchers with 
operational and joint experience. On the other 
hand, the experimenters were not able to include 
features in their scenarios that could not be 
supported (or developed) within the DOD-III in 
the available time frame. 
6 Conduct of the Experiment 
The short time window to design an experiment, 
develop the software and implement the scenario 
meant that these efforts proceeded simultaneously 
to a large extent. Much of the time pressure came 
from the opportunity to use two classes of junior 
officers at NPS as subjects, provided the 
experiment was run by mid-March 1996. As a 
result, it was not possible to run a full pilot prior 
to data-collection, so that values for numerous 
parameters, loadings, etc., were often chosen in an 
ad hoc manner to give what was believed to be 
adequate intra-team workload. To meet schedule, 
we were also operating ahead of any parallel 
modeling activity that might have shed light on 
parameter ranges. 
Several other issues that arose during the 
conduct of the experiment are discussed below. 
6.1 Operational Expertise 
The differing levels of experience among the 
subjects was a problem encountered during the 
conduct of the experiment. Those officers with 
significant operational experience and "mindset" 
adapted more easily to the scenario than those 
without that experience, and tended to perform 
better. Possible work-arounds in future 
experiments include: (1) "leveling the playing 
field" by making the scenarios less realistic and 
more oriented toward high-level decisionmaking 
(we do not see this as desirable), (2) requiring 
additional training (not practical if the intent is to 
bring a non-operationally experienced officer to 
the level of one with such experience), (3) 
excluding subjects without some relevant 
operational experience, or (4) finding some way to 
include the specialties of the non-operationally 
oriented in the scenarios. 
The lack of operational orientation was a 
problem with only the Navy OCS fleet support 
officers. The Navy and Air Force do not provide a 
significant operational training baseline for 
officers who do not attend a service academy or 
ROTC. If these officers are not in an operational 
specialty, then they have little or no exposure to 
operational issues. This is not the case with 
Marine or, to a lesser extent, Army officers who 
receive a common operational baseline at various 
service schools. Implementing approach (4) in 
our experiment would have required that a role be 
found for a legal officer, an instructor at Nuclear 
Power School, and a communications officer! 
The most practical solution is probably to exclude 
from the subject pool Navy and Air Force officers 
with no operational experience. 
6.2 Operational Associations 
Officers who were operationally experienced, but 
played a role outside of their area of expertise, 
tended to not function as well as those who played 
in their area of expertise. This was most 
noticeable in the MCC/GCC position. In an 
actual JTF, the GCC or MCC would likely be a 
subject matter expert-probably the senior ground 
or maritime officer in the JTF. Unfortunately, in 
our experiment, this was . not the case. Our 
organizational designs had either an MCC or a 
GCC, with the rest of the organization unchanged 
across all trials. Our experimental design had the 
same subject reside at the (GCC or MCC) middle 
level of the hierarchy for each run. Because of the 
demographics of our sample, Navy officers 
occupied this position on all four teams. While 
they had considerable expertise in maritime 
affairs, these officers were less expert in ground 
affairs than were their subordinate MEU 
commanders. This confounded the effect of the 
middle level of hierarchy, as the organizations 
853 
tended to perform better when the middle level 
was in the maritime component-as might be 
expected. A solution would be to study (1) a 
CJTF with four (two ground and two maritime) 
subordinate commanders, and (2) a CJTF with 
four (two ground and two maritime) subordinate 
commanders plus a GCC and an MCC. This 
would place a subject matter expert at the middle 
level of hierarchy in all cases (provided suitable 
subjects can be found), but would resurrect the 
issue of having different numbers of people 
between the two organizations. 
6.3 Training and Planning 
Some teams, particularly those with greater 
operational experience, viewed the experiment as 
an exercise in which their goal was to optimize 
performance. These teams conducted their own 
"team" training prior to the data runs; they went 
over the operations order (OPORDER) together, 
discussed its interpretation and implications, and 
formulated a plan consistent with the scenario. 
Other teams approached the experiment in a 
"cookbook" fashion, taking the plan that was 
given to them and executing it based on their 
initial training, with no further coordination, 
planning, or training on their own. Actually, the 
scenario was designed assuming/hoping that the 
subjects would take the second approach-so that 
they would not create their own task structures 
and thereby avoid the competition events that we 
were interested in. 
However, this is not a realistic assumption, 
and even runs counter to the concepts underlying 
the A2C2 project. It is precisely in the operational 
planning process that adaptation of organizational 
architectures are likely to take place. Here, the 
relative leisure, thoughtfulness, and potential for 
putting minds together to solve a problem exists, 
as compared with the more hectic "crisis 
management" atmosphere that prevails once the 
execution phase has begun. Also, commanders 
would probably be more willing to accept a 
restructuring of their organization during the 
planning phase than during the execution phase. 
For these reasons, a detailed planning phase 
should be included in future experiments. 
6.4 Common Operational Picture as a Research Issue 
Current thinking is that the common operational 
picture (COP) will result in more unselfish actions 
on the part of decisionmakers, and allow flattened 
organizational structures. However, there are as 
yet no reliable, statistically valid studies that have 
looked into this issue. An interesting modifica-
tion to this experiment would be to use 
operational picture (no COP and COP) and 
organizational structure as independent variables 
and test if this assumption is valid. 
7 Measuring Organizational Decisionmaking 
A major premise behind the current A2C2 project 
is that the (re)structuring of an organization 
should be driven by the characteristics ( and 
structure) of the task or mission the organization 
faces. The purpose of our first experimental study 
was to collect exploratory data to aid in 
formulating hypotheses about the ways 
organizational structures impact decisionmaking 
performance for different task structures. 
7.1 Measures of Performance 
Developing performance and process measures for 
teams, organizational units, or for an organization 
as a whole, is a challenge. One reason is that the 
higher one looks in the decisionmaking hierarchy 
the more one finds higher-level cognitive skills to 
be involved, requiring the experimenter to infer 
what cognitive activities are occurring from overt 
behaviors. Compounding the situation is that 
there are typically many ways for the mission to 
be accomplished even within the constraints posed 
by the task and organizational structures. 
Measures are needed that capture a team's 
situational awareness, the timely response to that 
assessment, and coordination ( of information, 
resources, and activities) among team members-
linked to the specific requirements of the mission 
and its underlying (sub)task structure. The speed 
and accuracy with which various tasks are 
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accomplished by the team are viable process 
measures. Communication patterns and content 
among team members yield coordination 
measures. Analysis of actions taken, given the 
information under the prescribed operational 
orders, yields measures of team performance. 
7.2 Situation Awareness 
In general, situation awareness (SA) refers to the 
DM's moment-by-moment ability to monitor and 
understand the state of the complex system and its 
environment [Adams, Tenney, and Pew, 1995]. 
This includes the ability to: (1) maintain an 
accurate perception of the surrounding 
environment: (2) identify problems and/or 
potential problems; (3) recognize a need for 
action; (4) note deviations in the mission; and (5) 
maintain awareness of tasks performed [Shrestha, 
et al., 1995]. 
The above concepts can be extended to team 
situation awareness wherein team members (who 
share goals) attempt to understand what their 
fellow team members are trying to do, how they 
are doing it, and why they have arrived at 
particular conclusions. This need for under-
standing applies both at a general level, and at the 
level of a particular decision. Overall team SA is 
the degree to which every team member possesses 
the SA required for his/her responsibilities. This 
awareness includes both enemy and friendly 
forces, facilities, weather, terrain, and the 
electromagnetic spectrum. 
Our working hypothesis was that the overall 
accuracy of the team's SA will affect team 
decisions regarding requests for assets, 
interpreting information and coordination 
requests, and overall team performance. Our 
challenge, then, was to devise a measurement 
instrument to assess how well team members held 
shared perceptions of task priorities, and the assets 
they would allocate to accomplish these tasks. 
7.2.1 Situational Awareness Probes 
This measurement instrument was admin-
istered by freezing the scenario at predetermined 
critical junctures and having subjects respond to a 
matrix-formatted questionnaire. Subjects were 
asked to indicate: (1) the current two highest 
priority tasks for each team position; (2) what 
asset each DM would likely use to accomplish 
those tasks; and (3) the highest priority task (and 
the resource allocation) that each team position 
would confront in the future. Questions 
addressed whether DMs were focusing on the (1) 
right tasks, (2) correct actions, and (3) appropriate 
mix of assets. 
The data analysis will compare between 
subjects to seek the degree of congruence of DMs' 
individual perceptions of the situation. For 
example, the CJTF may well hold a different 
"picture" than his low or mid-level commander. 
Specifically, we expect to find higher congruence 
between subordinates and the mid-level 
commander than between the subordinates and the 
CJTF. We can also compare subjects' responses 
with "ground truth," as based on the m1ss1on 
statement and the OPORDER. The data is 
currently under analysis. 
7.2.2 Issues in Probe Data Collection 
SA probes that are administered "on-the-fly" 
while the game is running-while realistic in an 
operational environment (DMs must often 
respond to status requests from superiors}--can 
lead to a loss of concentration, and thus yield 
incomplete data, on the part of subjects. For this 
reason it was decided to administer the probe by 
stopping the game. On the negative side, it is 
possible that when the game is restarted, the 
subjects might take different actions than what 
they would have taken had the game not been 
stopped. 
One of the problems faced in designing the SA 
probe involved timing. The best time to 
administer a SA probe to some subjects will likely 
be different than the time to probe other subjects 
because of the way they proceed through the 
scenario. All subjects may not be at a critical 
point at the same time in the scenario. We dealt 
with this problem by selecting times that we felt 
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were critical junctures for the team as a whole 
(e.g., taking the beaches). 
Subject feedback regarding the SA probe was 
mixed. Some subjects felt "put on the spot" when 
asked about positions for which they were unsure 
of. It is also possible that they did not like the 
interruption in the scenario caused by the freezing 
of the game. 
7.3 Measuring Conflict Over Assets 
The first experiment sought to examine how the 
presence ( or absence) of a mid-level, common 
functional commander impacted performance of 
subordinate DMs when the task required 
competition and coordination over scarce 
resources. Each scenario was carefully designed 
to have 3 or 4 critical tasks that involved 
competition for either organic or inorganic assets. 
In order to determine what situations are helped 
and/or hindered with two- versus three-tier 
organizations, we required a means to assess (and 
score) how DMs dealt with these conflicts. 
7.3.1 Competition-Over-Assets Observer Form 
An observer form was developed that listed 
the six most likely ways in which the lead team 
anticipated that subjects would resolve events 
involving competition. These included: (1) the 
owner of the asset transfers it on his own volition; 
(2) the owner of the asset transfers it in response 
to a teammate's request; (3) the owner keeps the 
asset in spite of a request for transfer, and the 
senior commander intervenes and transfers it; ( 4) 
in the absence of requests, the senior commander 
unilaterally transfers it; ( 5) the owner keeps it in 
spite of requests, and the senior commander does 
not intervene; and ( 6) there are no transfer 
requests, the senior commander does not 
intervene, and the owner keeps the asset. 
During the experiment, members of the lead 
team (acting as observers) monitored the subject 
team and recorded how conflict over the 
prescripted events were resolved. 
7.3.2 Issues in Measuring Competition Events 
We did not anticipate the large percentage of 
the time that teams would use other paths for 
resolving conflicts (approximately 50% of the 
time), nor the many variations in the ways that 
competition for assets would play out. For 
example, the DM who owned the asset sometimes 
performed the other DM's task, often after using 
the asset for his/her own task first. This strategy 
enabled DMs to maintain control of their assets, 
so they could subsequently use them for other 
tasks. In other cases, the DM in need of a 
particular asset sometimes substituted another 
asset to accomplish his task, when this was 
possible (thereby avoiding asset conflict). The 
(potentially) many paths a decision process can 
take, especially within a team, will require some 
rethinking of our preliminary approach. 
7.4 Communications Measures 
These measures capture the flow of information 
by recording who is "talking" to whom and the 
content of the various communications. These can 
be aggregated to measure the activity at different 
levels of the organization, during the performance 
of various types of tasks. 
To reduce the amount of time required for data 
reduction and analysis, the decision was made to 
develop a comprehensive set of messages required 
to perform the tasks in the scenario, and thus 
provide the capability to conduct all 
communications via the computer. This provides 
for automatically capturing all the data for this 
measurement. However, as discussed earlier, we 
fell short in developing a comprehensive enough 
set to satisfy the communication needs of the 
subjects. 
Our working hypothesis is that the way the 
organization utilizes its resources and 
communicates essential information are critical 
factors in determining organizational perfor-
mance. For example, past research indicates that 
the best performance is observed in teams that 
volunteer information when it is needed, suggest-
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ing that those teams had developed shared mental 
models. 
7.4.l Interactions Between Communications and SA 
It was possible that SA was impeded by using a 
restricted pre-formatted list of messages. Research 
indicates that people develop shared situational 
models through communication. This was 
reflected in comments such as: "It would have 
helped if I knew the intents of my team 
members." Use of natural voice communications 
in the experiment would allow DMs to articulate 
their reasoning for requesting support and assets, 
and provide critical explanatory information to 
team members on aspects of the unfolding/ 
evolving scenario. 
8 Summary 
Experiences associated with designing, 
implementing and conducting an initial Tier I 
experiment for the A2C2 project were described, 
in the areas of experimental design, scenario 
abstraction and design, task and organizational 
structure, software development, conduct of the 
experiment, and data collection instruments. We 
feel that it is important to document these "lessons 
learned" prior to embarking on subsequent tier I 
and tier II experimentation, and prior to 
conducting experiments in which organizational 
structure will be changed by subjects (as opposed 
to being fixed). Several of the shortcomings 
noted in this paper are currently being addressed 
by the research team, and will be modified further 
as the data analysis proceeds. Other issues, 
specifically those involving measure definition 
and collection, require more significant efforts, 
especially to develop measures that are 
indicators( or predictors) of structural adaptation. 
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